Explaining Murderous Ethnic Cleansing

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This paper is an overview of part of the contents of my ongoing book *Ethnic and Political Cleansing*. I have backed away from my original intention of giving an overview of the entire book and its conclusions, since such a paper would appear absurdly over-generalized, with space for hardly any empirical content. I have focussed upon the macro structures and processes which bring dangerous possibilities of murderous violence to situations of ethnic conflict. I do not discuss the micro-processes which take only some of these situations into actual mass murder, except in an abbreviated Appendix which may serve to give the flavour of my style of analysis.

This is a working paper, not a finished, polished piece.
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Explaining Ethnic Cleansing: The Trend and the Theories

The 20th century’s death-toll through murderous ethnic and political cleansing is somewhere between 60 and 120 million. No-one can know its true size. At the margin of any such figure would be further civilian deaths during 20th century wars. One estimate is that civilians accounted for only 5% of deaths in World War I, but grew to 60% in World War II and to more than 80% of deaths in wars of the 1970s and 1980s. The growth was not just the result of the technology of bombing, but of a broader and deliberate targetting of entire “peoples” as “the enemy” (Markusen & Kopf, 1995: 27-34). The century’s cleansings and wars have also spewed forth countless desperate columns of fleeing refugees. There are currently estimated to be about 20 million refugees in the world, fled from wars or ethnic or political cleansings. These are appalling statistics. Such horrors are not new to human history, but there does seem to have been a recent upswing. The 20th century has probably been the bloodiest and the most genocidal in human history (see the statistics of Rummel, 1992), while other forms of serious ethnic cleansing have also escalated in this century (Bell-Fialkoff, 1996: 21). Indeed, one quantitative study shows that violent “ethnopolitics” have been surging over the very last two decades of the century (Gurr, 1993). This was a very bad century, but the trend suggests the next one might be bad too.

Few earlier historical regimes seem to have intended to wipe out or expel whole civilian populations. It is difficult to be sure, since we rely mainly for our source material on texts which have obvious ideological as well as factual purpose. These sometimes suppress information about mass murder. But they sometimes exaggerate it in order to cowe their subjects into submission. Were the Assyrians quite so murderous as their bas reliefs or the Old Testament suggest? Were all the Israelites deported? Since ancient rulers generally wanted people to rule over, the answers are probably “no” (though Freeman, 1995, disagrees). Conquerors like the Assyrians, Babylonians and Egyptians may have only killed or deported troublesome elites or defiant cities. Of course, putting entire city populations to the sword would have involved thousands of deaths, but this would be a warning signal to other cities, not the beginning of something more systematic. Assyrian bas reliefs, for example, depict a linked trio of killing those who resist, accepting the submission of the rest and selective enslavement. Worse scenarios may have ensued where conquering tribes and peoples wished to use the land themselves, rather than use the labor of the conquered. The death rate would be greater if they were pastoralists expelling agriculturalists (since they needed broader swathes of land). Thus Huns and Mongols moving westwards (ie not into China where they wanted to live in style) may have been more murderous than Viking farmers. Since all such historical cases remain poorly documented, this is speculation. Yet there does seem something distinctively modern about ethnic cleansing.

The overall reason is not hard to find. As Gellner (1983) and myself (1986) have noted, most large states of history were essentially the private possession of upper class elites, whose cultures were quite different from the cultures of the masses. Nations didn’t exist, class divisions did. Thus mass cleansing of one “people” by another was unlikely. This is more of a hazard of societies where “whole peoples” share the same collective identities and political claims. That pins it down
to modernity and to two particular actors, modern nations and modern states.

It is difficult to stop ourselves naming whole nations/ethnicities as the main perpetrators. We routinely say “the Germans” committed “The Final Solution”, “the Serbs” and “the Croats” committed murderous cleansing against one another, “the Hutus” of Rwanda committed genocide. Yet all these descriptions are only partially true. Only some, in fact a small minority, of each named group did commit such atrocities. And this is precisely what we have to explain. Why, for example, is the final outcome one of “Serbs” cleansing “Croats” (and vice-versa)? The process of mobilization of national-ethnic constituencies by more discrete collective actors is the problem to be explained -- who were these actors, how did they become radicalized and how did they achieve their desired end-result?

Second, modern states are usually identified as the villains. The main founder of genocide studies, Leo Kuper (1981), argued that the modern state’s monopoly of power over a territory that was in reality culturally plural and economically stratified created both the political desire and power to commit genocide against out groups. Helen Fein says flatly "The victims of twentieth century premeditated genocide...were murdered in order to fulfill the state's design for a new order." (1984; cf Smith, 1987, and Horowitz, 1982). Some emphasize the technology available to the modern state: firearms, motorized transport, organization charts have escalated the efficiency of mass, bureaucratic, depersonalized killing (Baumann, 1991). Levene (1994: 24) adds that genocide is the consequence of "processes of state-led modernization...more particularly, a forced-pace acceleration of that modernization". These are all "top-down", elitist and cohesive images of states. States appear as collective actors with premeditated goals.

This view can also colour methodology. Harff and Gurr’s data-set of modern cases of genocide and politicide has become very widely used. It includes cases where “one or more identifiable groups were the target of deliberate attempts by ‘a ruling group’ to ‘bring about its physical destruction in whole or part’” (1988: 363). The inclusion of the term “ruling group” means that only state-led killing could be considered genocide or politicide. Thus their data-set does not include, for example, the communal Hindu-Muslim violence in India in 1947 which killed over half a million people but which was not state-led. And in cases which are included, it would seem to assume that the state rulers were the principal agents of the killings. This is rather problematic in cases where states were factionalized and where “popular” paramilitaries or other communal organizations, partly outside the control of the state, played a large role.

A statist view of genocide also fits in well with two fashionable social science theories. A “civil society” school of social theory has argued that the best guarantee of both democracy and peace is the strength of non-state secondary institutions within a country. These form “civil society”, which is seen as essentially virtuous. Where it is weak, states will perpetrate atrocities. But this is absolutely incorrect. Across most cases of murderous cleansing the perpetrating communities (e.g. Nazis or Krajina Serb nationalists) have had very strong secondary institutions. Indeed, such radical nationalists have succeeded precisely because of the greater density and mobilizing power of their civil society networks when compared to their political rivals (for the Nazis the data are
very good -- see Hagtvet, 1980, and Koshar, 1986). Second, a "democratic peace" school of political science theory has declared that democracies are essentially pacific, rarely fighting wars, almost never against each other (e.g. Doyle, 1983). The school's main representative in matters of mass murder is Rummel (1994: 12-27). He claims that the more authoritarian a state, the more likely it is to commit massive killing of civilians. But this is made half-plausible only by leaving out the majority of cases of mass murder, those committed against native peoples by 17th-early 20th century European settlers living under constitutional governments. Brass (1997) and Tambiah (1996) have also shown that in South Asia, inter-communal murderous violence (between Hindus and Muslims or Sikhs, and between Sri Lankans and Tamils) has risen in periods of vigorous electoral politics and declined under authoritarian martial law. The experience of Yugoslavia under authoritarian Titoist rule and then initially democratic post-communist republics is also a counter-example. And “majoritarian democracy” is the battle-cry of the Hutu Power movement which committed genocide in 1994. There is a relationship between democracy and genocide, but it is far more complex and double-edged than this state-centred school acknowledges.

Indeed there has been a recent reaction against statist theories. Several writers have remarked that murderous cleansing is perpetrated less by strong states than by states weakened and factionalized as a result of an unsuccessful war, a revolution or a civil war. Melson (1992: Chap 9) suggests that genocide occurs in wars following hard upon a revolution. Revolutions undermine the institutional and moral restraints of old regimes, create a potential moral vacuum and throw up movements seeking a wholesale transformation of society in the name of a mythical “people”. War then aggravates regimes’ feelings of vulnerability and/or invincibility in the face of their “enemies”, and permits states to become more coercive, while utilizing patriotism to legitimate their actions. The combination of revolution and war may also persuade a regime that domestic opponents are in league with deadly foreign enemies, to be legitimately killed. Krain (1997) shows (again using the Harff and Gurr data-set) that civil war is the most consistent predictor of the onset of murderous cleansing. Wielding typically bland American political science jargon, he labels such disasters as “changes in the political opportunity structure” -- ie the state is tottering, rendered vulnerable, up for grabs by contending, radicalizing power actors (cf Schock, 1996). Esty et al (1998) argue that, not strong but failed states have committed much of the mass killing of recent decades. Indeed, we should be wary of simple “top-down” theories of states. Even the authoritarianism of Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia was double-edged. True, there was a top-down chain of command, empowered, armed and sometimes bureaucratized. But these states were also permeated by turbulent mass movements -- the Nazi Party, the SA, the SS, the Bolshevik Party. Stalinist mass murders had a substantial popular “bottom-up” character, where low-level party members settled scores against political and economic elites (e.g. Viola, 1993); while the “radicalization” of parts of the Nazi movement was necessary to the regime’s genocide (e.g. Broszat, 1981). Though in all cases considered here the most powerful perpetrator was indeed “a state”, this was in the form of particular elites, parties and constituencies, and this was the end-point of a process of “radicalization”. The sociological task is to identify the exact political actors involved in this process.
**Necessary Concepts**

It is time to define some terms and distinguish between very different types of cleansing. The victims of cleansing are usually described as "ethnic groups", yet these are not "objective" categories. Most people see ethnic groups as sharing two characteristics: common culture and common descent. Yet culture is vague. It may subsume a shared religion or language, but it may merely refer to a sense that the group possesses something of a shared way of life -- which we then find we cannot precisely define. And the common descent of any “ethnicity”larger than a clan or a lineage -- for example, of Germans or Serbs -- is largely mythical. Neither group actually has common ancestors. In reality Germans or Serbs are descended from diverse historic groupings and they have also intermarried considerably with their neighbours. Thus claims to common descent in large groups are characteristically padded out with broader claims to communalty to produce socially constructed “macro-aggregated ethnicities”. There are various types of aggregation. Language is important for Germans, but not for Serbs; religion is important for Serbs, but not Germans. “Race” has been important among Europeans as a theory to explain obvious differences in civilizational power achievements in terms of observable phenotypical differences -- skin colour, facial bone structure etc. (Smedley, 1999). Imperial conquerors have also often themselves aggregated ethnicities by allocating provinces or distinct economic, political or military roles to varied groups they have defined as “peoples” or “tribes”, eg the Tutsi of Rwanda/ Burundi. If institutionalized over a period of time, definitions by the powerful in terms of language, religion, race and imperialism can all produce common cultures and endogamy. These ideological and political practices, created, often fictional, nonetheless succeeded in aggregating together what were originally quite diverse groups into larger ones considered by themselves and others to be distinct “ethnicities” -- Serbs and Croats, Ethiopians and Eritreans, Hutus and Tutsis, Spanish and Catalans etc. etc. These practices, usually gathering speed from the 17th to the 19th centuries, were an important part of the “raw material” of macro-ethnicity which modernity then worked into more salient and sometimes more murderous shape.

Given all this, we can only define the collective actors involved subjectively, in terms of what they themselves and their neighbours believe. Thus an **ethnicity** is a group which defines itself or is defined by others as sharing common descent and culture. Thus **ethnic cleansing** is the removal by a dominant ethnic group of an ethnic out group from its “own” society Two other collectivities will also be important. The **nation** is a group defining itself as sharing a common culture and history (a weaker version of “descent”) which also possesses or claims its own homeland and the exercise of collective political rights therein. Collective political rights exercised in a homeland usually result in a **nation-state**, though some nations claim only regional political autonomy within a broader state. Ethnic cleansing escalated enormously when modern nations and nation-states were overlaid on top of, and so reinforced the salient identity of, ethnic groups.

Ethnic groups may treat each other in very varied ways. Most of them do not involve murder. It is essential to put extreme and unusual forms of behaviour, like genocide, in their context.1

1 Since the advent of global journalism, the few near-genocidal cases are imprinted upon
does so, presenting the relations between groups in roughly ascending order of unpleasantness.

I will here be concentrating on the nastier ones, asking why escalation occurs. What are the particular processes which prevent ethnic groups treating each other in milder ways?

**TABLE 1**

Table 1 begins with the most benign policy of all, completely equal treatment and respect for out groups -- **multi-culturalism**. It is unfortunately rare. Multi-cultural politics might ignore ethnicity completely, treating all persons as equal regardless of their ethnicity. Constitutions do not mention the rights of sub-groups, parties do not organize around them. This is a common ideal in countries of ethnically highly plural immigration. Since such immigrant groups cannot plausibly claim their own state, they present no threat to the existing state, and the constitution can safely ignore their ethnicity. So the United States and Australia aspire to ethnically-blind multi-culturalism. But things differ where ethnic groups live densely and territorially and can potentially aspire to create their own states. Multi-cultural ideals here attempt to build collective guarantees for ethnicities into the political system by methods that are either confederal (ethnicities have their own political representation, usually regional, as in contemporary Nigeria) or consociational (they are guaranteed power-sharing at the centre, as in Belgium). Such entrenchments are to bind in each group to the state. We might note that "affirmative action" programmes are a much milder form of such guarantees. “Toleration” would be a weaker and more common version of near-equality, since it implies that we are at least trying to overcome our actual feelings of hostility toward the out group. But why are such ideal and near-ideal ways of coping with multi-ethnicity so distressingly rare?

A whole series of other policies may be more oppressive toward out groups but do not seek to cleanse them from society. **Discrimination** is the most common policy of all. It limits the rights of the out group but permits it to live amongst us. It may amount to such practices as preferential hiring, police harassment and negative stereotyping of out groups. Most countries contain this level of discrimination against minorities. Though not ideal, it is a lot better than what follows. If discrimination escalates, it may restrict fundamental rights like the right to acquire education, vote, public office or property ownership. **Apartheid** is more severe, lying between discrimination and cleansing, since the out group is permitted to live in society, but in segregated, ghettoized or enslaved conditions. Here not the society as a whole is cleansed, but more privileged sectors of it. Actually, apartheid is usually far more oppressive than the milder forms of cleansing specified below. After all, many slaves would like to run away from their oppression (which would produce

our consciousness. For example, in the continent of Africa outbreaks of mass killings between Hutus and Tutsis have been well-publicized. Yet such behavior is fairly exceptional in the continent -- where all states are multi-ethnic.
a more cleansed society) but are prevented by force from doing so.

**Assimilation** lies on the actual borders of cleansing. It does produce a “cleansed” society, but not primarily as a result of hostile actions of the dominant group. The mildest form of assimilation is where the out group voluntarily seeks admission into the dominant culture because of positive inducements. This is also common. Most immigrant groups in the United States or Australia have lost most of their earlier ethnic identity as they pursued economic and status success and social conformity and became Americans or Australians. This is a pretty harmless and marginal form of “cleansing”, lamented only by those who value the preservation of traditional cultures.

Cleansing proper (as most people would understand the term) introduces some form of coercion by the dominant group. **Cultural cleansing** involves only institutional repression. Public institutions suppress the culture of the out group whose identity is thus forcibly assimilated into the dominant group. The group’s language may be banned from schools or offices, its religion banned, its distinctive family names changed by law. Though this is coercive, it usually involves little physical force except to put down resistance to the policy. Such repression is not often viewed as "ethnic cleansing", though it is. But if it happens gradually over a very long period of time, it may not be generally remembered by either group as cleansing -- as, for example, with the substantial or partial assimilation of Welsh people into a British identity largely defined by the English, or Provencals or Acquitainians into French identity. Of course, many of the out group may react to the forms of ill-treatment I have just listed by emigrating, which is a further, part-voluntary form of “cleansing”.

Physical violence then begins with **coerced emigration**, pressuring the out-group’s removal by physical harassment and perhaps some seizing of property in the hope that flight will occur. The next escalation is to **deportation**, organized forcible removal, normally accompanied by considerable violence and even some murder. This can also involve mutual organized population exchanges, as for example in the Balkans where over the last 150 years hundreds of thousands of Christians have been exchanged for Muslims. Cleansing of a more “racial” form may involve distinctly **biological** policies. Here the out group is prevented from reproducing itself by restrictive marriage practices, escalating perhaps to forcible sterilization or to rape where the intent is to make the woman unlikely to bear children carrying the identity of the out group. Biological cleansing tends to centre on females, for obvious reasons. Then comes a type I have labelled **murderous cleansing**. By this I mean organized, repeated killings whose intention is normally dual -- to murder many but to terrify most of the rest into flight. Rape also frequently occurs alongside (and often escalates to) such murder as a way of inducing mass female flight.

Then I distinguish three murderous sub-types, each with a somewhat distinct victim group. **Forced conversion** is a religious sub-type, where the choice is convert or die. This was the choice given to many Serbs by Croat Ustasha forces during World War II: become Catholic or die. In historic pogroms, Jews were often given such a choice. **Politicide**, a recently-coined term, is where the intended target is the entire leadership and potential leadership class of a more generally victimized and feared group (as defined by Harff and Gurr, 1988: 360). Here the intention is to
cowe the rest of the out group into submission under severe discrimination, even apartheid. This is more than mere repression, since it involves mass murder -- as the Nazis practiced against educated Poles, or the Burundian Tutsis have against educated or trade unionist Hutus. I then add my own coined term, **classicide**, referring to the murderous killing by some modern leftists (Stalinists, Maoists and Khmer Rouge) of entire social classes considered to be irredeemable political rather than ethnic enemies. It is distinctive to leftists, since only they believe they can do without opposed (exploiting) classes. Rightist regimes of capitalists and landlords need workers and peasants to do the work for them. I am not discussing classicide in this paper.

Finally we have the two forms of near-total elimination by death. **Ethnocide** refers to a wiping out of a group and its culture which is not wholly intended by the dominant group. However, ethnocide normally involves extremely callous practices by the dominant group, which may even welcome the elimination of the out group when this occurs. Ethnocide characterized the main thrust of many terrible encounters between colonial settlers and indigenous peoples. The main killers were usually deadly diseases carried from the dominant to the out group or highly coercive forms of labour imposed by the settlers which wore down the natives toward death. Finally comes the very worst policy of all. I will follow the main thrust of the United Nations' definition: Genocide is a criminal act intended to destroy an ethnic, national or religious group, which is targeted for destruction as such. Unfortunately, the UN definition adds a confusing sub-clause, allowing either total or partial destruction to count as genocide. Like many others, I have difficulty with the concept of "partial genocide", unless this has a particular geographic connotation. Settlers in California in 1851 attempting to wipe out all the Indians from certain valleys were embarked upon local genocide. But a Serb regime in Kosovo in 1999 killing many Albanian intellectuals and men of military age (ie politicide), while deporting far more Albanians over the borders, was not committing any kind of genocide. Genocide is also fully intentional, aiming to wipe out an entire group -- though this goal is almost never completely attained. Genocide usually involves not only killings but also the attempt to eradicate cultural memory of the group (destroying its churches, libraries, museums, street names etc.).

These are ideal-type distinctions, of course. Real-world cases are typically mixed, and the ones considered here have tended to escalate up through this sequence. This paper concentrates on explaining the more severe cases, from murderous cleansing upwards. I shall collectively label these “murderous cleansing” (as in my title), except where I wish to be more specific. In this realm of highly unpleasant human activity, much scholarly energies have been devoted to deciding whether this or that case counts as genocide, mainly because international law (and therefore the possibility of legally punishing such murder in international courts) requires clear definitions. Yet actual social behaviour does not fall into neat conceptual boxes. For example, the 95% elimination of North American Indians was a mixed case, mostly unintended ethnocide, partly intended genocide. The historic pogroms directed against Jews criss-crossed the murderous boundary itself. Pogroms usually included violence and looting, plus more occasional bursts of forced religious conversions, rapes and murders. Few perpetrators conceived of removing Jews altogether -- they were too useful. Even murderous cleansing typically proceeds in erratic bursts, which either die away or produce backlashes. And even genocidal intent by some leaders may get
subverted by reluctance or resistance from below -- or vice versa. Most cases of more minor cleansing or inter-communal violence do not escalate to mass murder -- eg modern India, Northern Ireland and most areas of Indonesia.

Making distinctions like these immediately enables us to see two paradoxical features of modern ethnic cleansing. On the one hand, most ethnic relations involve forms of discrimination, not cleansing, and even most cleansing has been relatively mild. I again stress that genocide is extremely rare, while any form of murderous cleansing is uncommon. On the other hand, the result of these varied processes is that most of the more developed states in the world today are ethnically cleansed in the sense that they are substantially (ie over 70%) mono-ethnic, whereas in the past they were not. Minorities have largely “disappeared” from virtually all the more developed nation-states, The exceptions are mostly the countries composed mainly of fairly recent immigrants and their descendants (and they eliminated almost all the aboriginal populations). This raises two principal questions. Why has cleansing been so frequent, and why in only a few cases has it turned very nasty indeed? This latter is a much trickier and perhaps ultimately elusive task - - since it is always difficult to explain rare behaviour. Scholars tend to distinguish only five to ten cases of genocide, plus the more numerous but poorly-documented colonial cases. We cannot adequately test hypotheses concerning the more serious forms of cleansing since we do not have enough cases to control for the likely key variables.

An Overall Thesis and its Five World-Historical Phases:

I present a dual overall thesis. Though ethnic cleansing was not unknown in earlier history, it escalated with (a) the overlaying of modern nationalism on ethnic identities, sometimes buttressed by older religious and racial divisions; and (b) the rise of the modern state “as a moral project” (in the words of Perez-Diaz, 1993) and as expanding infrastructural powers. The villains, therefore, are the particular movements of extreme nationalism and statism identified later. The pre-modern and modern periods (c1500 onward) saw a long-term, five phase surge, led by Europe, in the ideal of "rule by the people", and this had the potentiality to generate more murderous cleansing than the world had previously experienced. The emergence of the notion of common citizenship for the people as a whole -- the fusion of the state with a common national culture -- and the notion that the state might be the bearer of moral progress could turn things really nasty. Murderous ethnic and political cleansing is far less ancient than modern. It is the dark side of democracy (Mann, 1999, Wimmer (1997) has made a similar argument in relation to post-colonial states. He argues that the politicization of ethnicity is an essential part of modern state-building. Only when people and state are mutually related within the sphere of a legitimate political order does the question arise as to which “people” is the legitimate owner of the state, entitled to is “public goods”.

However, I trace a more gradual and uneven process of this development, divided into five world-historical phases and places of its growth.

Phase One: Salvation Religions: In the pre-modern period the emergence and spread of major salvation religions began to encourage a sharing of culture between localities and classes, since all
were promised membership in the same religious community. This also put pressure on states to become more than just the private possession of dynasties and elites and embody the moral purity of the community. I shall not be analyzing this phase at any length, but we will see that its consequences fed into later phases. Christianity was the worst offender (as Barrington Moore, forthcoming, argues). Christians were the most prone to slaughter other religious communities (especially Jews and Muslims) as well as their own “heretics” in the centuries preceding the modern period. This was because Christianity most integrated people and state. It was doctrinally the most levelling of the world salvation religions. Christ preached salvation for all and is depicted as continuously favouring the poor and oppressed. After the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, Christianity also provided most integration between church and state. All classes could share a common identity, and sect, church and state leaders could vie to express the “true faith” of all. In contrast, Islam had a more separated church and state (and city and countryside), and it was also a religion carried forth by a warrior elite -- and much later by merchant elites. Thus it was less interested in the masses possessing the true faith, provided they were obedient political subjects or economic actors. Hinduism was tolerant in a different way, allowing for class and status differences of culture and purity to co-exist within its caste system. Like Buddhism it also allowed more distance between the sacred and the secular, and between religion and the state. But even in Christianity worldly, stratified Churches subverted Christ’s levelling message, while states did not actually belong to the people, but to the ruler and his peers. Thus mass political and ideological identities were not yet fused. But in later phases long-lived religious differences between whole communities could serve to exacerbate ethnic and national disputes. It is these subsequent phases that most concern me here.

Table 2 gives an overview of the general relations between ethnic distributions, political regimes and ethnic cleansing in Phases 2-5, which cover the modern period proper. The rest of the paper explains what is in this table.

TABLE 2

The arrangement of the table is two-fold. The rows of the table are ordered by the five main types of ethnic distributions found in the countries and regions of the world during the last three centuries. The columns are ordered according to the possible escalations of discrimination and cleansing which might develop in each of these five types. Some of these have much more escalatory potential than others do, provided they are conjoined to the additional structural conditions named in Column D. The most serious cases of murderous cleansing are named in Column E. They are what we have to explain. General (though usually non-sociological) accounts of these cases are available: for colonial cases, Smedley (1999) and Stannard (1996), for Armenia, Dadrian (1995); for the Nazis, Fein (1979) and Hilberg (1978); for Rwanda, Des Forges (1999); for Burundi, Lemarchand (1995); for European and Balkan coerced population movements, McCarthy (1995), Marrus (1985) and Pearson (1983); for Yugoslavia, Glenny (1993) and Woodward (1995). Of course, an adequate comparative account would also consider the very many cases in which serious danger threatens but is generally defused. I only touch upon these here, for reasons of space. The best accounts are of Indian and Sri Lankan incidents, provided by
Brass (1997) and Tambiah (1996). I only claim that this table offers a rough guide to the “danger areas”, the general circumstances in which serious ethnic cleansing is more likely to occur. It does not claim to be able to predict exactly where this will occur, only where there this is a possibility or an improbability. To get closer to a more complete explanation and prediction, we would have to add more micro-factors (briefly alluded to in my Appendix). I will discuss the processes identified in this table within the narrative framework of the remaining four Phases.

**Phase Two: The European Colonies.** At an early stage of the fusion of mass culture and polity, the sudden expansion of Europeans into other continents produced there ferocious cleansing, on a scale hitherto unknown even to Europeans. White ruled colonies fill the first sub-type of Row 1 in the table -- cases of rule by an ethnic minority. Colonial cleansing was rooted in two main zero-sum material clashes between conquering settlers and aboriginal peoples. One was a clash over who should possess the land, European agriculturalists or indigenous hunter-gatherers/simple agriculturalists, whose subsistence required much larger tracts of land per household. This clash was exacerbated by the settlers’ desire to enslave native and imported labor in mines and plantations. The possession of overwhelming military power by the colonists in all continents except Asia was decisive. Many natives were forcibly deported from their land, more were forced into slavery or indentured labor approximating to the type of discrimination I termed apartheid.

Similar practices by conquering settlers presumably also occurred many times in earlier history. But there were unique features of this era. This was the first trans-global expansion (or at least the first large-scale one). Thus conquest was not of neighbours or near-neighbours but of “alien” and, in terms of power, “inferior” forms of civilization, and it was of peoples of very different physical phenotypes. Their victory was thus plausibly interpreted by the settlers as being due to and validated by civilizational and racial superiority. They had little sense of community with the natives, did not need to compromise with them (except in Asia), and so they felt entitled to rule as they wished. It was God’s Will, Destiny or Progress. This made murderous cleansing, ethnocide and even genocide far more likely, I would suggest, than the conquests of earlier epochs.

The dangers of escalation into such murderous practices (Column D) are rather straightforward. White settlers just kept on coming in large numbers and the appetite of European capitalism for mines and plantations kept growing. This meant that in parts of the Americas and in Australia, where the settlers took virtually all the fertile land, and where aborigines were not effective slave laborers, the settlers desired to remove them by whatever means worked -- deportations escalated into murderous cleansing which escalated into ethnocide and genocide. This was not rare but the norm, and it continued over several centuries. It was rooted in an economic conflict, worsened by an enormous ideological gulf, decided by political and military power. In other parts of the Americas and in white settler parts of Africa, where some land remained for the natives and/or they were effective as slave or indentured laborers, the consequences were less disastrous, though still amounting to forms of apartheid, lessening to more selective apartheid or mere discrimination where whites were few enough to need to compromise with native elites. Asia was more varied, since it contained much greater varieties in local capacities to resist. Africa continued to endure bouts of murderous cleansing into the 20th century -- the last case being probably the
1907 near-genocide of the Herrero people of Namibia, at the hands of German colonists. But this type of cleansing still continues in Latin America and marginal regions of Asia in the form of repeated attempts to seize the land and so eliminate the populations of small indigenous peoples living in marginal forests, swamps and mountains.

Over these centuries, the infrastructural power of the modern state played little part except for occasional larger mobilizations of military power. Indeed, the severity of colonial cleansing was negatively related to the despotic power of both established Churches and states, and it was positively related to the degree of effective local democracy possessed by the settlers. The settlers themselves were the most clamorous for cleansing, and if necessary they would mobilize local political institutions and take militia action themselves. From the British North American colonies to German Namibia, it was usually the colonial state and the established churches who sought more restrained cleansing practices, the settlers who organized their own local cleansings and goaded the states toward more occasional large-scale atrocities. This was the first inkling of what “rule by the people” might bring in modern times.

Phase Three: Liberal Northwest Europe and White Colonial Polities. In the 17th and 18th centuries in northwest Europe came the modern revival of the ancient notion that “the people” should rule. This “people” was initially concerned to restrain state power, taxation and conscription. They did not want to use the state for more ambitious purposes. This encouraged two restraints: states could not mobilize ferocious repression of out groups, and out groups were not much interested in possessing the state anyway. Out groups were also the vast majority of the population, since “the people” meant only those adult males (sometimes just adult male household heads) who possessed property and education. This “people” was contrasted in the political theory of the time to the “populace”, “mob” or “masses” below, who were not thought worthy of political citizenship. Thus politics concerned class much more than ethnicity and the vital political issue was where to draw the franchise property line. In liberal regimes these disputes were partially resolved through the institutionalization of class and interest group conflict and this had the effect of tolerating diversity within the polity. The state and political parties would institutionalize conflict between contending “interests”. The nation of the liberal phase was not “organic” but diverse.

These liberal cases are almost all contained in Row 3 of Table. Obsessed by class, they tended to blur or de-emphasize ethnic differences. In Britain, for example, after 1688 all Protestant British property owners were confirmed as political citizens, and so ethnicity was marginal to questions of representation. After the 1832 standardization of the franchise, all adult Welsh or Scottish or Irish Protestant males who had freehold property to the value of £15 per annum were full political citizens. They were “the people”. This was also true of all 18th century North American white colonists worth the same property value, regardless of their European ethnicity or religion. The British polity never quite transcended the older religious conflict embedded in Ireland. Catholics got the vote only in 1829. But getting the vote did not necessarily give true representative rights. Thus in the 20th century Northern Ireland became not a liberal democracy but a “majoritarian ethnic (ie religious) democracy” -- the Protestants ruled through the ballot-box, as the Sinhalese
do today in Sri Lanka, or the Hutus did in the 1980s and early 1990s in Rwanda. Similarly, the North American polity never transcended “race”. Apart from these rather substantial limits of liberalism, however, in both settings only discrimination, assimilation and cultural cleansing were applied to other minority ethnicities. In Britain there also remained residual regional-national identities, which became entwined with class. Scots and Welsh could conceive of themselves as “proletarian nations” exploited by the capitalist-imperialist English. As we shall see, this sentiment was to become more widespread and far more intense across the world. But with these exceptions, class blurred ethnicity.

In the countries of northwest Europe and their white colonies later extensions of the franchise beyond just property-holders, into the admission of the “whole people” into representative government followed class and then gender lines and so continued to be largely ethnically-blind (with the same two religious and racial exceptions). All these countries have largely escaped more serious forms of ethnic cleansing -- except for colonial ethnocide/genocide and for the much milder escalations possible in majoritarian democracies of the Northern Ireland type. The growth of state infrastructural powers in the late 19th and 20th centuries then increased the value of acquiring political power. Patronage and corruption grew, producing ethnic/religious political cleavages in some countries (for example, in American cities). But only really in Northern Ireland and racially-divided parts of the American South did it escalate to one ethnic/religious group seizing the state to monopolize its resources and further the oppression of the out group. This relative mildness of ethnic relations has endured even through later periods of increased immigration into post-colonial America and Australasia, as well as during the recent increase of immigration into Europe. True, extremist European parties currently call for cultural cleansing and even some deportation of non-European migrants. Yet it is doubtful any can reach power. Ethnic tensions remain troublesome in Europe and America. They dominate contemporary sociological research to a far, far greater extent than does my main subject of enquiry here. But compared to murderous ethnic cleansing, you must forgive me if I say they seem rather trivial.

**Phase Four: Organic Nation-States in Central and Eastern Europe.** The demand for representative government which followed in later-developing central and eastern European countries did not follow the same liberal route. Here were entwined three of the macro-aggregations of ethnicity noted earlier. The religious faultlines between the Eastern and Western Christian Churches and Islam here coincided with imperial dynasties ruling over many former

\[2\] Northwest Europe did contain two exceptional cases where the achievement of representative government did not blur ethnicity but built it into its representative heart. I have not space here to discuss Belgium and Switzerland, but their confederal and consociational institutions have succeeded in guaranteeing near multi-culturalism in the state.
states and regions, converting them into provinces with their own administrations. This also coincided with language differences, though I will not stress their role in generating nationalist movements, for the reasons given later in relation to the South of the world. Rule was by an identifiable linguistic, ethnic and religious minority (German Catholic Habsburgs later allying with Magyars, Russian Orthodox Romanovs, Muslim Ottomans) over out groups generally compacted into being majorities over a local province -- Row 1 sub-type 3 in Table 2.

These imperial regimes were dual. On the one hand the ruling monarchies had despotic executive powers; on the other, they sought to varying extents to entrench collective rights for provinces, nationalities or religions into the structure of the state by consociational or confederal means (this was most developed in the Ottoman millet system). Faced with trouble from below, however, they usually fell back on despotic repression. Thus their consociational/confederal institutions never attained the ethnic balance of a Switzerland. Ultimately, power rested with the dynasty and its core ethnic minority, discriminating against other ethnic groups and sometimes seeking to cleanse their cultures. As local groups resisted, they defined themselves more in ethnic-national terms. Over most of this terrain the struggle for representative government became also a local “national” struggle against foreign imperial oppressors.

But by 1850 two things were changing. First, the ideal was now common that “the whole people” (ie all adult males) should rule. Elites could not long hold the line at property franchises. Nationalists soon took command of this struggle, arguing that “the people”, defined by ethnicity, was organic or “integral”, that is it was unitary, with one culture, one essence and one soul. Thus the future state should represent and express that unity, not diversity. Second, the notion that the state should itself achieve economic, social and moral progress was being aired, especially through theories of “late development”. The state was to offer more public goods which were worth sharing. The nation-state ideal, complete with organic nation and strong state, was growing. Attacks against imperial oppression within and capitalist oppression by the more advanced foreign Powers also generalized the theory of “proletarian nationalism” (though the term itself was only invented in 1911 by Corradini). This could yoke class-type hatreds to ethnic ones.

In the early 20th century statism strengthened into fascism and other ideologies demanding stronger states to achieve economic, social and moral improvement. Similarly, most liberation struggles generated powerful organicist movements asserting that states should at heart represent one dominant ethnicity -- Poland for the Poles, Romania for the Romanians etc. -- and exclude out groups. This meant excluding out groups from the state’s growing public goods, through potentially more serious discrimination and cleansing of out groups. As the multi-ethnic Empires weakened, their ethnic cores generated their own counter-nationalisms of pan-German, pan-Slav and pan-Turkic solidarity. When they fell (the Ottomans in a long 19th and early 20th century process, the others suddenly in 1917-18), they were replaced by nation-states. This process was completed in Europe by 1920, except for Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. This produced ethnic balances similar to those of Row 2 subtype 2 of Table 2 -- majoritarian democracies. However, where one state’s minority was a neighbouring state’s majority, they fit more precisely into Row 3 -- Brubaker’s (1996: Chap 3) scenario of three contending groups of (majority) nationalizing
state, national minorities and external national homeland. Thus, for example, interwar Romania contained a 70% Romanian population voting mainly for political parties seeking to “Romanianize” the state, plus a variety of ethnic minorities -- four of which (Magyars, Germans, Ukrainians and Bulgarians) were linked to foreign states. Though interwar states’ constitutions in central and eastern Europe contained guarantees of civil and political citizenship rights for minorities, these were effectively dead letters by the mid 1930s. By then even Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were experiencing Serb and Czech pressures to nationalize their ostensibly multi-ethnic states.

Thus the secular trend which can be observed over the North of the world over the last 250 years toward 70%+ mono-ethnic states was accomplished through these last two phases. Phase three countries saw mostly only fairly mild discrimination which could be ended by assimilation. Thus ethnicity has not much further troubled the northwest. Its white ex-colonies have been greatly troubled by racism, but not by other serious manifestations of ethnic conflict. Phase four often involved more cleansing, escalating beyond cultural cleansing though normally only to coerced emigration.

However, there were two places in the east and center of Europe involved in phase four where the new organic nationalism was laid over and supercharged by the religious hostilities of Phase 1. Both resulted in further escalation of cleansing. First, in the Balkans advancing Christian nationalists unleashed murderous ethnic cleansing on the retreating imperial Ottoman Muslims. Second, the period 1850-1920 also saw a new political anti-semitism directed by Christian nationalists, mainly in the far east of the continent, against Jews whom they conceived of as alien cosmopolitan exploiters of the nation. Pogroms and more consistent pressures toward coerced emigration produced mass Jewish flight westward from Russia and Eastern Poland, creating new Jewish population concentrations in Romania, Hungary, Austria and the eastern borders of Germany. This intensified as a result of the mass slaughter aimed at Jews during the Russian Civil War. So political anti-semitism spread westward, with the Jewish migration.

These two cases then escalated to the first modern genocides. “Young Turks” who first came to power in 1908 were expressing organic Turkish nationalism by 1913. This was a significant switch from either Ottomanist or Islamic ideology (though neither of these had been fully abandoned), since it was less tolerant of minorities. They escalated the notion of exacting revenge against those they conceived to be part of their Christian oppressors, the Armenians living in the Turkish lands. They committed genocide against them in 1915 (had Turkey not lost the war, the Greek population might have followed). The Nazis and their eastern ethnic nationalist allies escalated to genocide of the Jews. Croatian nationalists also now seized their chance, for by killing the Nazis’ target of the Jews, they could also assail Serbs (their former imperial oppressors) with a mixed policy of murderous cleansing and forced conversion.

However, to get nearer to an explanation of these cases, we must add the developments contained in Column D of Row 3. Brubaker’s blend necessarily embroils ethnic majorities and minorities with geopolitical power relations between states. Thus the principal escalations were provided by
war and its three most divisive consequences: Military defeat, the weakening or collapse of ruling regimes and imposed losses in state territories. These are very much in line with the reasoning of scholars like Melson and Krain quoted earlier. Territorial losses also tend to produce embittered refugees and nationalist “revisionists”, demanding the return of “lost territories”, who proved to be the core of extreme nationalism. To understand the position of the Armenian minority in Turkey, Brubaker’s blend must be slightly modified. Their desired “homeland” did not already exist abroad, since there was no Armenian state. In fact, Armenian political movements were split between seeking their own brand-new state or demanding more regional autonomy within the two main countries in which they lived, Turkey and/or Russia. But “Uncle Russia”, which was Christian and Turkey’s long-term enemy, was seen as more supportive than the faction of the Young Turks in power from 1913. Continuing defeats and loss of European territories to Christian states culminated in the Balkan War of 1912-13, whereby Turkey was forced back almost to the Bosphorus itself. These disasters destabilized and radicalized the state. First came the Young Turk coup of 1908, removing power from the more multi-ethnic regime of the Sultan. This was half-reversed the following year, but then completed in 1913. This brand-new state had to cope next year with World War I, which began with the mauling of Turkey’s eastern armies by the Russians. The Young Turks were now turning to the ideals of Turkic nationalism and more statism to turn the tide and stave off final collapse. This was a desperate imperial revisionism, fearing the very survival of the state -- now conceived of as a nation-state. The Armenians seemed to represent the enemy within: Christian and somewhat pro-Russian (since Russia was by now promising to help set up an Armenian state) -- and essentially unprotected by a foreign Power (unlike the Greek Christian minority). Organic nationalists urged that the purification of the Turkish nation start with the Armenians. Since the relevant Turkish records have been destroyed, we don’t know whether the ensuing events were planned beforehand or whether they erratically but rapidly escalated as power shifted to hard liners. But within months, politicide directed at Armenian intellectuals and soldiers was followed by mass deportations of Armenians away from the war zone (supposedly so they could not aid the Russians), and then genocide of somewhere around one million Armenians, 50-70% of all Armenians living in Turkish territories.

Nazi-led genocides went down a not dissimilar path. I hesitate before summarizing their complex causes in only one paragraph. The principal difficulty confronting any rational explanation is that the Jewish victims (who suffered the most complete genocide) constituted no plausible “threat” whatsoever to the German nation-state -- unlike Armenians, Tutsis, Sudanese Christians etc., who might be conceivably so identified as threatening by their murderers. Yet the other main victims, Slavs, were a more plausible threat -- and actually more Slav civilians or disarmed POWs were killed than Jews. The key to Nazi genocide, however, also concerns massive war defeat, imposed territorial and power losses, the overthrowal of two German states (imperial and Weimar) and the radicalization of a third (Nazi). These involved a turn from a klein (small) to a grossdeutsch (big German) version of German nationalism. This oriented Germany to imperialist revisionism in

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3. This paragraph also summarizes the fruits of four long chapters of my book -- so it is not entirely unsupported.
the east, to a goal of the organic unity of all Germans (who were almost all in the east) -- and so to the core area of 20th century political anti-semitism, specifically to the more virulent antisemitism of many Austrian Germans (including Hitler himself), and toward the threatening power of the Soviet Union and its supposed ally, the “Judeo-Bolshevik”, who was actually the key “enemy” identified by Hitler and his myrmidons. Hitler’s principal allies in genocide -- Baltic, Ukrainian, Romanian, Hungarian and Croatian organic nationalists -- all experienced similar deadly brews of territorial changes and revisionism, and all had other threatening ethnic enemies to whom they could more plausibly link the Jews. Only the Croats made no such ideological connection between Jews and their threatening enemies, Serbs.

The end of World War II saw further massive deportations of populations. Revenge was especially exacted upon eastern Germans. Continued minor population exchanges continued among Bulgarians, Greeks and Turks in the decades after the war, culminating in the partition of Cyprus and coerced emigration of the minority from each of the island’s two halves. The main hold-outs against the triumph of this often-murderous organic nationalism across almost the whole of central and eastern Europe were the two authoritarian multi-ethnic regimes of the Soviet Union and Titoist Yugoslavia (Row 4, subtype 2). The collapse of the former has as yet brought only scattered ethnic cleansing. This was probably because the break-up of the Soviet Union into separate states was usually along clear republican boundaries and it was not contested by Russians -- hence no imperial revisionism challenged by proletarian nationalisms (except in Chechnya).

Things were different in Yugoslavia, where the imperial nation, Serbia, contested break-up and immediately sent its armed forces against the breakaway republics. Serbia backed down over Slovenia where there were virtually no Serbs and no common (let alone a disputed) border with Serbia. With Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo it was different. Many Serbs lived across the borders of these republics and territorial revisionism and aspirations for a greater Serb organic unity fueled the conflict into massive murderous ethnic cleansing. Again, these were destabilized states in which the ousting of more multi-cultural-minded communist leaders had been accomplished by nationalists, usually of the organic type. Even in Serbia, which had the most continuous state institutions from the Titoist era, Milosevic had launched his coup against “bureaucratic” communism by playing the nationalist card.

Phase Five: “Nation-states” in the South. In the 20th century the “South” of the world was struggling for colonial liberation. Many of its political movements also initially adopted a “whole people” organic nationalism usually taking a “proletarian” form. Such, for example, was “Third World Socialism”: The whole people was said to constitute a proletariat exploited by the imperialist-capitalist North. Obviously, the whites were rarely seen as being part of this proletarian nation. They were imperialism’s fifth column. But three factors reduced the possibility that revenge might be exacted against them in the form of ethnic cleansing. First, decolonization was usually negotiated. Weakened by World War II the colonial powers mostly reacted at quite an early stage of the armed struggle by negotiating a peaceful withdrawal. Second, the whites were still protected by the Western Great Powers. Third, there could be a mutually-advantageous division of powers between whites and natives: Whites would continue to run much of the
economy (since native leaders believed they could not immediately do this themselves), but natives would run the state. Thus Africa and South Asia saw relatively little revenge cleansing of whites. Where cleansing did occur (because one or more of the three factors named above was not present), the colonists were mostly subjected only to coerced emigration, as in French Vietnam or North Africa. The *pieds noirs* settlers simply shipped out to France.

But in most of the South the nation-state ideal was hard to reconcile with the actual weakness of the state and the norm of multiple ethnicities. These were less-developed societies whose indigenous political structures had been replaced by states whose higher levels were quite alien to the country. Since natives had not been admitted to key state areas, ethnicity had not been much politicized and remained more locally based and far more diverse than it had been in early modern Europe. Post-colonial states also experienced more difficulty in establishing routinized infrastructures of rule than had early modern European states. Nonetheless, in the second half of the 20th century states were expected to achieve far more and so were allocated more of the country’s resources. Even if countries of the South took the capitalist rather than the socialist route, a far higher proportion of economic resources were channelled through the state than in any of the countries yet discussed. This reached its extreme in the most backward countries in the world, in which the value of development funds and licenses and monopolies to foreign and domestic companies far outweigh any developed “free market” sectors of the economy. Thus possession of the state or participation in the patronage networks of those who do possess the state become extraordinarily valuable resources. Possession of the state is worth fighting over. In countries like Zaire/ Congo, Rwanda or Burundi participation in such networks may be the only way to reach above a bare subsistence economy. This may lead to the “kleptocratic” state identified by Evans (1995) in Zaire. This is the polar opposite of the first modern attempts at representative government in which states possessed few desirable public goods and the intention was actually to avoid the power of the state. Yet in the 20th century possession of the state and its public goods and powers became the dominant political ideal across most of the South. This intensifies power struggles between “ins” and “outs” over possession of the state. This tends to politicize and nationalize many ethnic tensions which would otherwise remain at a more local communal level.

Patterns of post-colonial ethnicity are actually extremely varied. But the most usual pattern is multiple ethnicities, originally locally-rooted, though become somewhat intermingled by urbanization and the colonial experience. This is Row 5 in Table 2: Multiple indigenous ethnic minorities, none forming a majority. All have a great incentive to be represented in the state, which controls many valuable resources. Yet it is difficult to find political forms which can hold such diversity together in countries with poor communications and often a low density of population. Once the colonial oppressors had been removed from the state, the nationalist coalition proved hard to hold together. Tensions have often grown involving some political and inter-communal violence between ethnic groups. At the extreme it could result in local, regional or even national disintegration. Yet large-scale ethnic cleansing has been rare (unless the conditions listed in Column D are also present). This is because it is very difficult to achieve stable government without cross-ethnic coalitions of party, administrative and military elites. One
hundred ethnic groups may cause political instability and generate considerable violence, even
civil war. In the Congo or Sierra Leone this may result in the deaths of thousands -- but not
usually in the form of direct ethnic cleansing. No ethnicity is strong enough to accomplish this on
its own on more than a local scale. Even if one does, it is not very likely to make explicit appeals
to ethnic solidarity or organic nationalism, since it has to find allies from other groups.

If multi-ethnicity in the South generally protects against murderous ethnic cleansing, we should
look to explain the cases where it does occur in terms of the “macro-aggregating” processes I
identified earlier in the paper, whereby originally local ethnicities might get aggregated together.
Table 2 identifies three principal ones. First come a legacy of colonialism, the whites’ tendency to
identify certain “tribes” or “peoples” as those especially useful as clients in its rule. The British
identified the Baganda of Uganda as being especially useful; the Belgians identified the Tutsis of
Rwanda and Burundi. This had certain effects on these “peoples” themselves. Though such ethnic
identities were already real to natives -- ie they were not totally constructed by the colonizers --
their salience increased. And since these client peoples now possessed valuable resources --
education, jobs in the colonial administration and its economic spin-offs -- their size often
increased. We know that in Rwanda the political salience of the Tutsi/ Hutu divide increased.
Hutu ruling clans declined, Tutsi-led clans became more purely Tutsi, and more Tutsis emerged to
swill at the colonial trough. Thus in a number of post-colonial countries one “macro-ethnicity”,
enlarged and solidified by colonial rule, controlled the state, despite usually being a minority. This
held certain dangers in the form of the likelihood of highly repressive rule, though rather more
would be needed to turn this toward murderous ethnic cleansing.

Second, province might play this macro-aggregating role, as noted in Row 5 subtype 1. States are
necessarily territorial and their administrations convert overlapping regional areas into bordered
provinces to which fixed resources, sub- administrations and representative institutions are
allocated. The political representatives of some provinces become permanent “ins” at the capital.
Other provinces’ politicians feel excluded and this may paper over an originally diverse ethnic
base in a solid bloc of discontented provincials. Of course, a province with its own administration
can become a state, simply by declaring itself so. Thus secession is a possible goal, though this
may provoke civil war and massive killing. This may be defined as ethnic cleansing -- as in Biafra,
East Timor and northern Sri Lanka.

Of course, further ethnic cement in East Timor and Sri Lanka has been provided by religion,
which is my third aggregator. This is noted in Row 5, sub-type 3. The practice of Buddhism,
Hinduism, Islam or Christianity -- or indeed any of their sects -- may aggregate together highly
diverse local and ethnic groups. This will fuel conflict only when in group and out groups are
religiously divided. Sudan is the most murderous case, in which diverse northern ethnic groups are
Muslim (and Arabic-speaking). Northern political leaders have sought to impose cultural
cleansing on the diverse out-groups of the south -- who are Christian or animist. Southern
resistance has led to repression, and thence to murderous cleansing of some areas. Perhaps
200,000 people, mainly southerners, have been killed. Huntington has identified the boundaries
between the world religions as fault lines inducing violence throughout the world -- especially, he
claims, the fault line between Islam and Christianity. Though he may over argue the case (and he also shows a Christian anti-Islamic bias), many of the most severe current flashpoints involving ethnic groups are along such fault lines: the Sudan, Armenia/ Azerbaijan, Russia/ Chechnya, East Timor, Hindus and Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Hindu fundamentalists versus Islamic militants in India and Kashmir.

It seems, however, that language differences are not in themselves aggregators that lead toward much cleansing. Laitin (1999) has demonstrated that though language differences are associated with inter-communal political conflict, they actually reduce the chance of violent conflict. This is probably because language acquisition is easy and it is individually instrumental, if all that is required is access to education and jobs. Thus individuals (especially potential community leaders) speaking a language that is excluded from the state and its valued resources, can also learn the dominant language, without abandoning their original language or the ethnic identity that it may convey. An individual can use both languages, one mainly in the public sphere, the other in the private sphere. One cannot hold more than one of the major religions of the world at the same time, since none of them will permit this. Languages that do provoke severe violence are typically holy languages, like Arabic in the Sudan, whose forcible imposition southerners perceive as not just related to instrumental access to resources, but as an attempt at Islamicization.

On the other hand, not even the three aggregating factors just named typically lead onto murderous ethnic on a large-scale. We need more explanatory factors. Let us turn to Rwanda and Burundi, easily the best-documented cases of genocide and politicide in the South. As I noted, both had two “dangerous” attributes: A colonial-era hardening and politicizing of ethnic identity and a post-colonial funnelling of economic resources through the state. Possession of the state really mattered. Additionally, both ethnicities possessed their own capacities and claims to control the state. Hutus (85% of the populations) had weight of numbers and democratic claims (“majoritarian democracy” was the main slogan of the Hutu Power movement). Tutsis had more education, wealth, political patronage and control of the officer corps -- and so, they claimed, their abilities fitted them to rule. Obviously, these two capacities and claims were on some sort of collision course. But why could it not be compromised with negotiated quotas and consociational power-sharing arrangements? Indeed, through the early 1990s such negotiations resulted in the Arusha Accords, which may have been about to be signed when genocide was let loose.

The Belgians had left one further dangerous legacy. Though they had initially elevated the political power of the Tutsis, the last colonial administrations and the Catholic Church had recognized that this was in violation of modern democratic precepts. In the last years of rule they changed horses in Rwanda and began to do so in Burundi. The states experienced some destabilization. Elections brought Hutus into power in Rwanda, and they used political power to remove Tutsis from civilian and military positions. The pressures led to considerable coerced emigration. Experienced soldiers among the Tutsi emigres formed a key part of the winning side in the Ugandan Civil War. The new Ugandan government allowed them to use their equipment to make armed incursions back into Rwanda. Military successes turned this into a real Civil War in the north of the country. Both Hutu and Tutsi political leadership became split over whether to
end the war by compromise or victory, but power within the Hutu regime turned decisively
toward radical Hutu Power organic nationalists. When the plane carrying back the President from
Arusha (carrying the Accords) was shot down (probably by the radicals) in April 1994, the
radicals launched the genocide of the Tutsis. 500-700,000 were slaughtered over three months.
We see here a slightly different form of what we also saw in European murderous cases. Not an
international war but a foreign-assisted civil war furthered the destabilization and radicalization of
a government which already in flux. Burundi saw a less destabilized version of this, since the
Tutsis (watching closely events in Rwanda) refused to let go of the state. When the Tutsi party
was defeated in elections, the Tutsi-dominated army stepped in to mount a coup. Together with
Tutsi radicals they also launched the 1993 politicide.

Macro Conclusion

The entry of “the people”, first through salvationist religions, then through aspirations for political
democracy, created the potentiality for an upsurge in murderous cleansing. This was first starkly
revealed in the European colonies. Yet in the early liberal states of Europe itself, this was defused
by the domination of politics by class. This was much less pronounced in later-modernizing areas
of Europe and the world. In Central and Eastern Europe religious boundaries and states and
provinces swallowed into larger imperial states created quite a concentrated pattern of a few
aggregated “macro-ethnicities”, each eventually constituting a majority in a single state. This
proved dangerous. In the South of the world we more typically find multiple ethnicities contesting
the politics of a single state. These lend themselves less to ethnic cleansing, than to often-
precarious confederal/ consociational power-sharing arrangements. But if these fail, state
disintegration leads to more anarchic forms of violence than ethnic cleansing.

Thus smaller numbers of contending ethnicities are more dangerous. Bi- and tri-ethnic states and
regions with cross-border ethnicities are most prone to ethnic conflict and cleansing, since the
nation-state ideal is strong, since they are claiming sovereignty over the same territory and since
each ethnicity feels able to secure its own state, either through secession or irredentism (joining
with a neighbouring state). Majorities may become confident of their numbers and so of their
democratic legitimacy. In control of the state, they believe it should express the needs of the
whole organic people, not those of minorities. Minorities may be confident of their regional
majority and legitimacy, and so capable of secession; or hope that their homeland or a
neighbouring state will protect them. Some minorities may also possess superior resources of their
own, though there must here be added the condition that they cannot divide up the spoils with the
majority (one normally taking the economy, the other the polity). Conflict is worsened when
nationalist identities becomes entwined with class-like sentiments, one claiming to be a
“proletarian nation”, the other reacting to this with the injured innocence of a threatened
property-owner -- the “revisionist imperial nation” whose property rights are being violated.

Serious danger threatens when the main actors dealing with these confrontations -- which still
have alternative solutions -- are destabilized by sudden regime or geopolitical changes. Such
political crises destabilize customary political institutions which have allowed the compromise of ethnic conflict. They also allow “radical” factions to appear offering more violent solutions. When compromising or repressive state institutions collapse, or when borders shift or geopolitical balance ends, escalation toward murderous cleansing is most likely. War itself is the most serious escalator. It normalizes and legitimizes killing. Minorities, especially those with foreign “homelands” or those who are unusually cosmopolitan, can be identified with the threatening enemy. They must be dealt with by armed force. And war provides “Night and Fog” under whose cover actual genocide can be launched. Yet even this combination of forces does not always lead to murderous cleansing, and rarely does it lead to genocide. Micro-level explanations must be added. I give a taste of some of these in my Appendix.
Appendix: Pared-Down Micro Theses Concerning Genocide

Based on Young Turk, Fascist (including Nazi), Serb, Croat, Bosnian, Hutu and Tutsi cases

Overall thesis. Escalations simultaneously involve relations between perpetrator and victim groups, and between potential perpetrators and their own ethnic community. Through the interaction of these two processes, extreme organic nation-statists come to mobilize more power resources than conservative\ liberal\ socialist multi-cultural, discriminatory or assimilationist rivals within their own community. I do not yet understand these processes of escalation sufficiently, and have not here the space to discuss them adequately. There follow some brief observations about the micro-processes I do understand. I organize them around the four main sources of social power.

1. Economic Power. Capitalism and its class and interest group conflicts play relatively little part in descent into murderous cleansing. Economic downswings may increase the general level of discontent, but are the product of military or political conflict or destabilization. Murderous ethnic cleansing is not usually economically rational and is not usually initially precipitated by such reasoning. However, economic resources secured by control of the state are important, and will be considered when dealing with political power. Extreme nationalists generally have less wealth than their more moderate rivals -- ie they do not mobilize significant economic power. Nor is their quantity of manpower greater than their rivals'. Rather its “quality” (see ideology & military below) overwhelms rivals. Once cleansing looms, however, material looting motives become important to many, sometimes most, perpetrators, and may greatly increase their numbers. Yet moral and institutional restraints against this first need removing (see ideology and polity below).

2. Ideological Power. In such "imagined communities", ideologists obviously do much work, especially in convincing people that “ethnicity” is a primary, moral identity necessitating loyalty. Ethnicity is often experienced concretely, but serious conflict occurs when ethnic disputes become seen as “civilizational” ones, linked to broader ideologies beyond material experience (Horowitz, 1985). Religion, race and especially nation provide these broader ideologies. These develop two alternative ideologies (a) The dominant group sees its very “survival” threatened by ethnic aliens, normally seen as aided by foreign Powers (Turks, Nazis, Hungarian fascists, Serbs, Tutsis). (b) An exploited majority viewing itself as a "proletarian nation" demands the ideal of modern “majoritarian democracy" (Hutus, Romanian fascists, Serbia's enemies). These claims do have minimal plausibility, and in all cases they have resonated through the greater mobilizing power of nationalists' social and cultural clubs in civil society. These provide the logistical infrastructure for the mobilization of extreme nationalism. These movements claim a high “moral” content, and they "cage" militants by demanding sacrifices of their time, energy and lives. Rituals involving songs, poetry, religion, flags, marches etc. intensify emotional commitment and comradeship. Caged commitment plus emotional passion outweigh rivals’ more instrumentally- rational interest models.

3. Military Power. Violence brings distinct processes to conflict -- ie must analyze the changing
balance of military force. (a) The state's military and police forces, possessing the best weapons and logistics of coercion, are necessary to the success of larger murderous cleansing, especially genocide. The military and police are core perpetrators or immobilized. This helped by their being part of the core constituency of support for extreme nationalists and statists. Where the regime is disintegrating (Yugoslav, Burundi) or new and not yet institutionalized (Young Turk, fascist, Rwanda), military and/or police may initiate covert or coup violence. (b) Additionally, extreme nationalists form armed paramilitaries. These are disproportionately recruited from refugees and threatened border regions, plus other extreme nationalist or statist constituencies. Violent core is drawn disproportionately from young military veterans, students, young workers and members of rifle, gymnastic and contact sports clubs. Ideals of "virility" and "masculinity" are important to the "toughening" which "dirty work" requires. This is a decisive edge over the rivals. Few moderate rival movements form effective paramilitaries (since they regard violence as immoral), so as "radicalization" occurs, they are coerced into silence. Rival ethnic paramilitaries mutually escalate by coercively protecting their own community (all cases except fascists, for whom war is the equivalent process). 20th cent military technology has also "democratized" warfare, allowing popular, youthful armed bands wielding handguns to create mayhem -- nowadays they wield AK47s. Providing the army is at least immobilized by its nationalist sympathies, these paramilitaries may actually seize power or begin the murderous cleansing. The combination of ideological and military power, escalated past a certain point, forces mutual withdrawal into ethnically-defined, ideologically-insulated communities. The combination also makes the paradoxical notion of "moral murder" central to the commission of murderous cleansing.

4. Political Power. Modern states are particularly dangerous because (a) organic conceptions of democracy give states the moral right to "purify" and "cleanse" and (b) their increased infrastructural powers make it more desirable for groups in conflict to politicize and claim the state as theirs. The seizure of state power then enhances the claim to routinized legitimacy, especially where elections have actually been won by radical nationalists (nationalists within all the Yugoslav republics, Hutus, Nazis and some other fascists more marginally). State power also gives control over military\ police forces, massive patronage resources and routinized administrative agencies (transport, communications, supplies etc). All use the power and legitimacy of the captured and radicalized state. This, combined with economically-motivated looting, brings mass participants in murder.

Both "democratic" and authoritarian states have been complicit. Perpetrator states are always disrupted and radicalizing "party-states" (taken over by a party movement), not stable bureaucracies. Murdorous cleansing rarely emerges from stable "totalitarian" regimes but from destabilized, radicalizing ones. The extent of genocide depends on the completeness of control exercised by this rebuilt radicalized party/state.

Countering genocidal movements thus means (a) understanding the macro-forces which put certain ethnic configurations "at risk"; (b) countering these specific ideological, military & political micro-powers wielded by nationalists.
Bibliography

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Cambridge University Press.
Table 1: The Relations Between Ethnic Groups: from Multi-Culturalism to Genocide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. NON-CLEANSING</th>
<th>No suppression of out group identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Multi-Culturalism</td>
<td>Equal treatment -- politics ethnically-blind or confederal\ consociational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discrimination</td>
<td>Out group lives among dominant group, but with limited rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Apartheid</td>
<td>Out group lives among dominant group, but segregated -- as slaves, in ghettos or as non-citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Assimilation</td>
<td>Out group voluntarily abandons its identity, adopts dominant culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. CLEANSING</th>
<th>Cultural or physical suppression of out group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cultural</td>
<td>Suppression of cultural identity -- ban language, religion, family names</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coerced Emigration</td>
<td>Physical harrassment intended to secure flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Deportation</td>
<td>Organized physical removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Biological</td>
<td>Prevent reproduction: sterilization, forced marriage, some forms of rape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Murderous</td>
<td>Many killings &amp; rapes, but mainly designed to force more general flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Forced Conversion</td>
<td>Religious subtype: convert or die</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Politicide</td>
<td>Wiping out of potential leadership of out group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Classicide</td>
<td>Leftist political subtype: wiping out of opposed class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ethnocide</td>
<td>Mostly unintended but callous removal of out group: disease, forced labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Genocide</td>
<td>Killing &amp; cultural eradication of entire ethnic group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: 17th-20th Century Ethnic Distributions, Political Regimes and Ethnic Cleansing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Ethnic Balance</th>
<th>B. Dominant Political Regime</th>
<th>C. Routine Cleansing Tendencies?</th>
<th>D. Possible Dangers of Escalation</th>
<th>E. More Serious Cleansing Results?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Multiple Indigenous Minority Ethnicities</td>
<td>Rule by patron-client ethnic coalitions (parties, elites or military factions); confed/consociational institutions necessary to stability: most of Africa, India &amp; Indonesia</td>
<td>No -- only discrim. by “in” coalition v “outs”, plus repression &amp; local communal violence</td>
<td>1. Coalition breaks up, regime collapses 2. Ins &amp; outs acquire provincial macro-identities, secession &amp; irredentist demands 3. Ins &amp; outs acquire religious macro-identities, purify state.</td>
<td>1. More communal violence, state breakdown, anarchy but not ethnic cleansing: Congo, Sierra Leone. 2 Civil war, politicide &amp; mass cultural cleansing: E. Timor, Biafra. 3. Ditto: Sudan, (Sri Lanka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Multi-ethnic immigrants</td>
<td>First major colonizers dominate ethnically-blind polity: USA, Australia</td>
<td>Discrim, assim. then multi-cultural trend</td>
<td>Immigrants favour alternative state or borders.</td>
<td>No cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>