The Global Society and the
Latino Community: Changing the Americas from Within the U.S
By Frank Bonilla
Introduction
In the fall of 1992, along with two colleagues, Professors Setsuko Nishi
and Hylan Lewis, I offered a graduate seminar at CUNY on U.S. Racial
and Ethnic Stratification in the 199Os. We set out to cover shifts in the
status and social roles of African-Americans, Asians and Latinos in the
U.S. since World War II. Taking Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma
as a benchmark, we attempted to track internal and external factors
associated with changes in the definitions, perceptions and social placement
of these groups as reflected in current scholarship and theoretical perspectives.
An American Dilemma makes practically no allusions to Latinos
in the U.S. Puerto Ricans and Cubans are absent from the index. The single
reference to Mexican Americans describes a study of labor practices in
Los Angeles in the 192Os. In workplaces where Mexicans were considered
"colored," they worked side by side with Blacks and often had Black supervisors.
Where they were considered "white," they worked alongside whites but were
rarely in positions of command. Such inconsistencies in the treatment of
racially suspect groups were said to be typical of large northern cities
at the time. Today census tabulations are careful to point out that "Hispanics
may be of any race," and cries of alarm in respected quarters decry the
"latinization" of major cities and regions and even call for a "militarization"
of the border to cut off illegal entries from the south.
Still, in the wake of victory in WWII, the term colonialism was also
absent from the volume's index; imperialism was mentioned only to note
the U.S. lack of vocation for international adventure. Nationalism figured
only as a fringe or splinter ideology in Negro politics. A major presumption
was that immigration to the U.S. after World War II would prove a minor
factor in social relations.
By contrast, as we have seen in the last two days, the 199Os debate
concerning race and class is now inextricably entwined with gender and
ethnicity and embedded in concerns over a broad array of unanticipated
contextual conditions and processes. Globalization of the economy and new
realities of economic and political interdependence and competitiveness
among regions and states now loom large in these discussions. Transnational
migration flows not readily harnessed to the economic interests of host
or sending countries add new complexities. The ineffectiveness of international
pacts and organizations is matched by the internal disarticulation
of national and local governments and policies. A breakdown of corporate-labor
pacts as well as governmental social infrastructural supports shifts the
burden of adapting to economic restructuring and lags in productivity upon
the most vulnerable workers -- notably youth, women, recent immigrants
and minority urban enclaves. Successive irruption of racial and ethnic
violence signal the coming to a head of a new crisis/transition in the
production and containment of social inequality in every quarter of the
emergent world order.
In the U.S., new demographic realities mandate that any racial
or ethnic inquiry --Latino, Asian or African-American -- give a high priority
to the particulars of national origin, regional concentration, and the
history of incorporation into U.S. society of each sub-group. Attention
to detail and the distinctive configurations of each community's experience
does not necessarily mean senseless fragmentation but often illuminates
historically obscured convergences and systemic features of enduring subordination
and strategies of resistance. This 1992 seminar, for example, brought to
the surface some commonalities and sustained interactions between Latinos
and Asians -- with Puerto Ricans in Hawaii, with Mexicans in California,
with other Latino nationalities in the Caribbean and South America. Within
the U.S. today, Latinos and Asians are the major driving forces of demographic
growth and cultural diversification. Official projections anticipate that
the Asian population will more than triple between 1990 and 2020 (from
7 to 23 million) while Latinos, growing from a larger base will only double
(from about 23 to some 49 million) but will constitute over 15 percent
of the total U.S. 2020 population.
Global Economics and Cultural Equity
The changes adumbrated in the 1992 seminar sketched above brought home
the message that events, global in scale, are now reaching into life everywhere.
Unfortunately, it was also clear that those whose normal business
it is to tell us exactly what those changes are, the forces driving these
transformations, how wide ranging and lasting they will turn out to be,
and their implications for "third world peoples' were and remain all over
the place on these questions.
Flextech
On at least one point there was an early rough consensus -- the economy,
the world of work and wealth creation -- has taken on new forms now interconnected
the world around. Some people (notably Michael Piore and Charles Sabel
at MIT) spoke about a new mode of production taking shape. The "flextech"
economy, as it was labeled early on, came with a list of associated buzz
words - decentralization, out sourcing, dehierarchization, integration
of conception and execution, spontaneous coordination, interchangeable
modules, learning systems, and so on. Emanating from Europe, some talked
about this as an Italian model. Prototype sites in the U.S. included Massachusetts'
Route 128, California's Silicon Valley, and some Los Angeles counties.
The emphasis in this instance has been on new technologies, new slants
on management, worker participation (e.g., quality circles) but also on
locations offering large reserves of unorganized, willing, low wage labor
and local governments ready to reward modest capital commitments with generous
incentives. Flextech also came quickly to mean very movable, with a short
investment cycle or turnover (5-10 years) and even installations scrappable
on short notice without major loss. The new mobility of capital was seen
as not only regional but transnational in reach.
The Service Economy
A number of sociologists began to talk about a so-called post-industrial
economy as flextech made industrial production leaner and various mixes
of services became the commanding sectors of national economies. This was
again a largely European formulation though certain U.S. regions soon became
front runners in this mode. The paths into the post-industrial differ in
the mix of services (especially in the role of the public sector), in the
impact of restructuring on labor market demand and supply, in the consequences
for social stratification and class contention, in the efficacy of state
response to the dislocations in employment and income affecting different
groups, and in the way political institutions of every kind attempt to
cope with these effects. The service economy was early seen as an essentially
intra-national phenomenon but soon postulated high-tech took on some of
the supra-national mobility features of transformations.4
The Global Mega-city
Yet another perspective draws selectively from many sources but emphasizes
a world system focus in accounting for the extraordinary growth of a handful
of cities as a function of their specialized places or niches in national
and world economies. New York, Los Angeles, London, Tokyo, Sao Paulo, Mexico
City -figure among this array of supra-national urban formations. Each
is said to embody a particular configuration of the interplay of transnational,
national, regional and local economic, political and cultural forces set
in motion over recent decades. The combination of massive in-migration
from within each nation and abroad, with a consequent polarization and
segmentation of labor demand brings yet another economic adaptation into
focus here -- the informal economy and the increased significance of small
business, micro-enterprise and other forms of self-employment in filling
the gap in labor demand.5
Regimes of Accumulation
Most persuasive in this connection is Robert Heilbroner's formulation of
a regime change.6 The regime change idea includes most of the
notions of technological, managerial, workplace and market innovations
associated with flextech and the service economy. There is more emphasis,
however, on ideological and value changes, especially in class relations,
implicit in ongoing transnational restructuring. An alleged "Fordist" pact
between capital and labor that sustained the earlier mass production regime
is said to have broken down in the course of the '70s as strong unions
demanded wage increases not matched by productivity gains. The consequences
--stagnation or declines in productivity, the deployment of manufacturing,
investment inertia, the glutting of local markets, international debt,
increased international competition-- have all fed the process that Heilbroner
calls the institutionalization of the business class as the
universal
class. As the distinguished economist, Lady Joan Robinson had warned in
the early '60s, the only thing worse than being exploited by capitalists
is not to be exploited at all. As the job base shrank and downward pressures
on wages intensified, leading working class sectors and their organizations,
as Heilbroner and others found, opted to protect their status and pass
on the losses in compensation and reductions in the social wage to their
less secure workmates -- women, youth, minorities and new immigrants. Heilbroner
also emphasizes the detachment of the economy from its traditional political
and geographic moorings. Capitals with no enduring commitments to localities
or contingents of workers seek to operate in political spaces in which
state power also shies away from guaranteeing social infrastructures for
the whole population. While the world celebrates "the triumph of capitalism,"
the social crises visibly in the making over the last two decades may augur
a reassertion of state controls or as Heilbroner himself puts it, "a coming
meltdown of traditional capitalism."
It is important to keep clear that much economic analysis over
this period has proceeded in complacent disregard or direct rejection of
any such assertions about fundamental realignments in the relation between
the nation-state and the economy or subnational political institutions.
While a trend toward internationalization is generally acknowledged, it
is not universally seen as a significant disturbance of post-war arrangements.
Internationalization, say some, really means only a redeployment of some
manufacturing and a few services. Critical areas such as research and development,
communication flows and currency markets remain within the firm control
of national and international bodies dominated by the more powerful nations.
The collapse of socialism only adds to the number of nations in the queue
for incorporation into the capitalist international. Foreign investment
in the U.S. is still modest and useful, if not essential. There are some
questions of competitiveness and national reassertion that need to be addressed
but also many opportunities and imperatives for international collaboration
and cooperation as the new hemispheric order (read here, most recently
NAFTA) is secured in place.7
What has all this to do with Third World cultures and cultural production?
Whichever of the foregoing scenarios comes to prevail sets decisive conditions
under which the historically marginalized and excluded will have to contest
new structures of domination. Some fresh and encouraging people-based perspectives
are provided in a recent book, Global Visions: Beyond the New World
Order,
edited by Jeremy Brecher and several associates. This volume
balances hard evidence of the enduring power of traditional "hierarchs,"
that is, economic and political elites, with moving accounts of leaps in
self-discovery, construction of identities and resistance among the world's
most oppressed peoples.8
Global Visions sharply contrasts what it calls "globalization
from above and from below. The project from above, driven by transnational
corporations and international financial institutions, all ostensibly under
the United Nations mantle, has been producing increased poverty, social
polarization, inequality among nations, demographic turmoil, political
repression and militarization. The vision from below embraces the idea
of a true world community or civil society. It is embodied in a range of
international peoples' movements for global solidarity, the rebuilding
of community, protecting natural resources, restoring participatory democracy
and anchoring these in effective transborder organizations.
The transition from "Global Pillage to Global Village," as championed
by a related group linked to the American Friends Service Committee, is
grounded in the conviction that the very forces creating a capitalist,
individualistic and hierarchical cosmopolitanism can nurture a new sense
of "transborder" community and civility among those now mired in subordinate,
voiceless statuses in the various orders of economic restructuring that
have been sketched above. More is at issue here than the accelerated intermingling
of culturally diverse peoples within single nation borders; the reality
that only those states and systems that learn to live with their diversity
will survive the current transition is being dramatically brought home.
Looming baffles over immigration in both the U.S. and Europe now threaten
major reversals on this front. Still, the present mobility of capital both
requires and promotes an equivalent infrastructure for others in the social
order. The increasing need for millions around the globe to anchor their
existence in more than one social formation for generations at a time is
transforming the very idea of citizenship, human rights, and the role of
cultural expressions and identities in sustaining sociability. Progressive
solutions lie not in any mandate for individuals to abandon cherished lifeways
and identities or to pass up opportunities to enrich these from the multiple
sources all now encounter in a normal lifetime. What we are now stretching
for; more urgently than ever, are new standards of international responsibility
and solidarity.
The Global Society and the Latino Community
Over the last several decades, Latinos in the U.S. have emerged as strategic
actors in major processes of social transformation. This new reality --
the Latinization of the U.S. -- asserts itself demographically, politically,
in the workplace, in every aspect of day to day life and is driven by forces
that extend well beyond U.S. borders. The perception that Latinos are now
positioned to share in bringing about change in the Americas from within
the U.S. has increasingly taken hold and has sparked renewed interest and
specific initiatives by hemispheric governments to cultivate new forms
of relationships with emigrant communities.
In mid-December of '94, the Inter-University Program for Latino
Research, which I currently head, convened a conference at the Rockefeller
Foundation's Bellagio Center in northern Italy. Scholars, policy specialists,
community advocates and cultural workers came together to undertake a comprehensive
conceptualization and stocktaking of pertinent research and policy on transnational
dimensions of the present condition and promise of Latino peoples. Over
the last decade, IUP has promoted a substantial body of research into the
significance of the dynamic manifested in the binational and global processes
of the major Latino communities in the U.S. -- Mexicans, Puerto Ricans,
Cubans, and Central Americans. Four themes were highlighted in sessions
extending over three days: (1) Emergent forms of global and transnational
interdependence; (2) Retro impacts within the U.S., especially in Latino
communities, of economic and political restructuring along with their demographic
components; (3) Changing concepts and social bases for community formation,
citizenship, political participation and human rights as individuals are
obliged to construct identities and day to day life in more than one sociopolitical
setting and (4) Fresh pathways for entry into international relations and
issue oriented social movements and organizations among these highly mobile
populations. A primary objective of the event was the formulation of a
long term research, policy and organization building agenda interlinking
the intellectual and political resources generated over recent years by
Latinos in the U.S. with their counterparts in their countries of origin.
A very brief sketch of the substantive treatment of each of the conference's
four main themes will help convey what was accomplished on this front and
some of the common ground between that exercise and the work here over
the last three days.
I. Global Interdependence
The four presentations on this theme highlighted the complexity of the
interlocking patterns of change involved in emergent forms of interdependence
between the U.S. and Latin America -- the movement of capitals, modes of
industrialization, trade, migration, and growing inequality over recent
decades. The interplay between the fluidity of movement across political
boundaries and the continued reassertion of regional and community controls
over economic processes situates Latinos throughout the hemisphere in strategic
positions to define and assert new interests, identities and voices in
economic and foreign policy. Clearly, a highly touted show of unanimity
with respect to a broad array of reformist strategies embraced by Latin
American presidents at a Miami Summit of the Americas two days before the
Bellagio meeting belied the objective indeterminacy of the outcomes of
these measures and the potential roles of social actors not represented
there. This tension between the premises and projections of those committed
to specific "neo-liberal" policies and those wishing to withhold judgment
while further inquiries proceed surfaced repeatedly.
II. The Reconfigured United States
Parallel processes of restructuring within the U.S., some directly tied
to transnational dynamics, are shaping the modes of incorporation of Latinos
into the work force and other institutional domains. National origin weighs
markedly in these adaptations via the formation of networks, enclaves,
shared social capital and distinctive forms of social performance. At the
same time, growing inequality is reinforced by institutionalized exclusion,
selective incorporation, and heightened hostility against newcomers. Extensive
recent research documents variants of these phenomena among the principal
Latino populations and similarly situated communities. Evidence has been
mustered as well on the defensive empowering strategies brought into place
by Latinos over the last few decades that now position them to responsibly
claim a place in the policy making apparatus at every level. The centrality
of Latino Studies in this connection and the linking of these intellectual
resources to the challenges of theorizing and analyzing global and hemispheric
charges was a salient point in this part of the discussion.
III. Community, Identity and Civil Rights
As noted above, diaspora communities closely identify themselves along
national origin lines while political demands call for or seek to impose
overarching Latino identities. The tensions between community processes
and the structures available through which people can participate in politics
are particularly complicated. Added to these realities is the fact that
interactions between homeland and host country events reach directly into
the lives of most Latinos. Events as diverse as the 1994 Chiapas uprising,
peace processes in Central America, aftereffects of the implementation
of NAFTA, Proposition 187, changing patterns of border crossings and their
policing, changes in refugee and immigration law -- must all be addressed
in terms of their human and legal dimensions. There are few analytical,
practical, and ever fewer legal constructs with which people can both understand
and act upon these disparate and often conflictful relationships. Conventional
models of assimilation deal with only a narrow segment of these problems.
This panel brought together community organizers, lawyers, human
rights advocates, artists, and academics from the humanities and social
sciences to discuss these issues. The encounter was encouraging and productive.
The successful integration of these perspectives foreshadowed at the conference
should prove a distinctive feature in the forthcoming volume and videos.
IV. International Dialogue
Sharply contrasting views of the conditions and prospects for more inclusive
and productive international dialogue more responsive to human needs and
rights surfaced in these sessions. On the one hand, an optimistic vision
substantially fed by the outcome of the still fresh Summit of the Americas
in Miami emphasized recent advances toward full democratization of formally
elected governments, accompanied by commitments to government reforms,
renewed social initiatives, and a revitalized partnership between the U.S.
and Latin America. However, detailed treatment of the Cuban instance as
well as emergent "bottom up' perspectives articulated by labor unions,
feminists, environmentalists, and human rights advocates documented persistent
inequalities and the limited progress being made in advancing popular interests
in the transnational setting despite the increasing activity of non-governmental
organizations. In addition, an overview of competing models for regional
integration and development (European, Asian, and Western) found them all
to be in serious trouble, especially in their capacity to deal with persistent
and growing inequality and popular discontent. These conclusions were not
seen as discouraging but as a reaffirmation of an already shared vision
of the complexity of the task ahead and its long term character. Yet, with
speakers present on the cutting edge of labors on all these fronts, realistic
grounds for mapping a Latino strategy through this maze of contradictions
would seem to be within reach.
Changing the Americas from Within the U.S.
Ironically, the growing perception that Latinos and other minorities
in the U.S. are destined to play an increasingly proactive role in U.S.
foreign and domestic policy crystallized in the very decade, the '80s,
that dealt them the most serious material setbacks since the 1930 depression
years. Characteristically, perhaps, this new potential manifests itself
just as the practical instruments for positive policy interventions confront
critical challenges that have manifestly thrown the national and international
policy establishment into disarray. Latino claims to enhanced readiness
and practical capacity to responsibly enter these policy domains must be
seen against the backdrop of authoritatively declared crises in the social
and natural sciences and their pertinence to policy formation. The disjuncture
between social scientific endeavors and technocratic policy management
is pervasive and especially so for new voices seeking to legitimate historically
ignored perspectives. Thus, the call in 1992 by a Gulbenkian Foundation
commission for a comprehensive "restructuring of the social sciences" signaled
widespread concern regarding the bounds of traditional disciplines and
distinctive scientific "cultures." "Scholars," the commission noted, "feel
dismayed at the state of the social sciences, but very little is being
done collectively to change the situation. 10
This is a far cry from the reigning mentality some three decades
ago. Daniel Bell, speaking for a National Commission on the Year 2000 then
confidently declared that there was no foreseeable economic or political
challenge in what remained of the century that the U.S. economy and political
structure could not resolve. More recently, however, he has come to see
the work of essaying projections into the next century as akin to "lighting
a small candle in the middle of a hurricane to see if there is a way out."11
This form of discourse has now reached new heights and has penetrated
the natural sciences. Today, physicist Murray Gell-mann, holder of a 1969
Nobel award and currently probing the dilemmas of reconciling the adaptive
strategies of human communities with those driven by natural evolution
on a planetary scale, dramatically echoes the imagery evoked by Bell Immanent
contradictions in the adaptive schemata of the biosphere over some four
billion years are, in his view, now poised to converge destructively in
a not too distant future with cognate processes of human adaptation over
some 100 million years. Speaking of a recently launched Project 2050 seeking
to map paths toward "sustainable" development in the coming century, that
is, a future in which both human communities and the natural environment
may prosper, he has this to say. "We are all in a situation that resembles
driving a fast vehicle at night over unknown terrain that is rough, full
of gullies, with precipices not far off. Some kind of headlight, even a
feeble and flickering one may help to avoid some of the worst disasters."12
Cited in the Bellagic setting, this vision had a special resonance.
The Gell-manns among scientists, of course, see poverty-stricken,
tropical nations as prime scenarios for the unfolding in the decades immediately
ahead of this apocalyptic vision. In this light, they can construe ongoing
debt swaps between the U.S. and Latin American nations that include some
provisions-for environmental measures as "planetary bargains."13
However, equally pressing planetary bargains remain to be undertaken within
the U.S. and especially in communities along the U.S.-Mexico border and
in major cities across the country where Latino peoples have emerged over
the recent past as the most segregated and most subject to environmental
hazards.14
Of course, less abstruse forms of growing U.S.- Latin American interdependence
have been widely acknowledged for some time. What has remained obscure
are the implications in terms of U.S. policy of these recent transformations,
especially with the successive changes in U.S. national administrations.
The point here is the emerging realization that there is now no clearly
framed U.S. policy toward Latin America and that whatever stances are improvised
will depend much more on how the U.S. manages its own internal social crisis.
Abraham Lowenthal, a seasoned Latin Americanist and Executive Director
of Inter-American Dialogue has stated the matter forthrightly: "...the
single greatest factor that will define U.S. - Latin American relations
in the decade of the '90s will be whether and how the U.S1 confronts its
own economic and political agenda."15
Should these insights prove accurate, they add to the conditions
set to draw significant contingents of U.S. based Latinos into social contentions
across national boundaries. The limited gestures toward democratization
that have been a part of more than a decade of neo-liberal economic reform
in most of Latin America have done little to cushion the harsh impact of
deepening absolute poverty and undiminished inequality and even less to
muster hopes and popular support for reforms by government decree.16
The inefficacy of traditional left and labor organizations in present circumstances
seems also to have set in motion a combined movement of ethnic, gender
and regional resistance partly modeled on and readily linked with its counterparts
in the U.S.
"As ethnic and gender demands come into Latin America's social
consciousness, positive outcomes can fortify the future of tridimensional
alliances (ethnicity, gender, class) on a basis of equality. ...From this
communal point of reference, and in association with a set of political
commonalities, movements can become transnational indeed. It is in this
communal space where there are clear bases for creating transcommunal cadres
as answers to transnational attacks.
To not develop such trans-communal cadres for the 21st century is to
risk a weakened, divided and conflicted marginalized general population
confronted by a well-united ruling social bloc that is actually quite demographically
diverse but which is separated by class and privilege from the rest of
the America[s]."17
As noted earlier, in these pages I have drawn on a group
research effort extending over the last ten years. This sustained and multipronged
undertaking developed under the auspices of the inter-University Program
for Latino Research, a consortium of university based research centers
now numbering nine. We have been seeking to chronicle in a critical spirit
the structural processes and active interventions within and outside U.S.
Latino communities that have produced the complex of challenges and opportunities
for resistance and constructive action in social policy that have been
sketched in the foregoing pages.
ENDNOTES
1.The course outline (U.S. Racial and Ethnic Stratification in the 1990s,
Sociology U859.10, CUNY Graduate Center Fall, 1992) is available from the
author. See also Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma New York: Harper &
Row, 1942.
2. See Rebecca Morales and Frank Bonilla eds., Latinos in a Changing
U.S. Economy. Newbury Park CA; Sage Publications, 1993. Also Paul Ong,
ed., The State of Asian Pacific America: Economic Diversity, issues and
Policies, Los Angeles, CA: Leap Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute
and UCLA Asian American Studies Center, 1994. See also U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Current Population Reports, P23-183, Hispanic Americans Today,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash., D.C., 1993 and U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Minority Economic Profile: 1990 Census, Congressional Affairs Office,
Wash., D.C., 1993.
3. Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second industrial Divide, New
York: Basic Books, 1984.
4. Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone. The Great U-Turn: Corporate
Restructuring and Polarization of America. New York: Basic Books, 1988.
Also T.J. Novelle, Beyond industrial Dualism, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987.
5 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton,
NI: Princeton University Press, 1991.
6. Robert Helbroner, "Reflections: The Triumph of Capitalism, The New
Yorker, 64, (1) 1989: (98-1O9). Also his "The Coming Meltdown of Traditional
Capitalism," Ethics and International Affairs, New York: Vol. II, 1988.
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1988.
7. W. Baumol, 'Is There a U.S. Productivity Crisis?", Science, 243 (2891),
611-615.
8. Jeremy Brecher, John Brown Childs, and Jill Cutter, Global Visions:
Beyond the New World Order. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1993.
9. Armando Rendon, "Latinos: Breaking the Cycle of Survival to Tackle
Global Affairs," in Chris F. Garcia, ed., Latinos and the Political System,
Notre
Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987.
10. Newsletter, Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical
Systems and Civilizations, State University of New York at Binghampton,
No. 17, August, 1992.
11. Daniel Bell,"The World and the U.S. in 2013,' Daedalus. 116, 3:1-31,
1987. See also his 'The Year 2000 - the Trajectory of an Idea,' Daedalus,
96, 3: 631-651, 1967.
12. Murray Gell-mann, The quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple
and the Complex, New York, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1994, p.366.
13. Ibid., p. 337.
14. Paul M. Ong and Evelyn Blumenberg, 'An Unnatural Tradeoff: Latinos
and Environmental Justice,' in Rebecca Morales and Frank Bonilla, eds.,
Latinos in a Changing U.S. Economy: Comparative Perspectives on Growing
inequality (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993 See also T.J. Lueck,
'U.S. Study Finds Hispanic Minority Most Often Subject to Victimization."
New York Times, 11-13-91: R1.
15. Abraham F. Lowenthal, 'Los Estados Unidos y America Latina en un
mundo nuevo,' Norte-Sur: La Revista de las Americas, 2, 1, Junio-Julio
1992.
16. William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuna, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, eds.,
Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform: Theoretical
and Comparative Perspectives for the 1990s, (New Brunswick, NI: Transaction
Publishers, 1994)
17. John Brown Childs, "Preliminary Notes for the Utilization of Gramsci
in Strategizing Race/Ethnicity/ and Political Progress in the Late 20th
Century United States.' Santa Cruz: Chicano-Latino Research Center, UCSC.
Working Paper, 1993 oiled in Susanne Jonas and Edward J. McCaughan, eds.,
Latin America Face the Twenty First Century: Reconstructing a Social Justice
Agenda, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994)